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Mosher: Two Year Limitations Period Applicable to Texas General Fraud Sta

SECURITIES REGULATION-Rule 1Ob-5-Two Year
Limitations Period Applicable to Texas General Fraud Statute
Applies to 1Ob-5 Actions When Texas is Forum State and
Cause of Action Accrued Prior to 1977.
Wood v. Combustion Engineering Inc.,
643 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981)
Stockholders of American Pole Company, in 1973, accepted an offer to
exchange their stock for the stock of Combustion Engineering, Inc. in
connection with a merger of the two corporations. In May of 1977, the
stockholders filed suit in Federal District Court for the Southern District
of Texas seeking damages under sections 10 and 23 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 and under rule 10b-5s for alleged fraudulent misrepresentations made in conjunction with the exchange. The action was filed
less than three years, but more than two years after the discovery of the
alleged fraud. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding the
claim barred under the Texas two year statute of limititations for general
fraud.8 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the Appellant-stockholders contended the three year statute of
limitations in the Texas Securities Act should apply to 10b-5 actions
brought in Texas federal courts.4 Held-Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The two year limitations period applicable to the Texas General Fraud
1. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976). Section 10(b)

prohibits the use of "manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivences in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Securities Exchange Commission may prescribe." Id. §

10(b). Section 23 authorizes the Securities Exchange Commission to make rules and regulations necessary for the protection of investors and the public interest. Id. § 78(i).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). Rule 10b-5 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to (a) employ any device scheme or artifice to
defraud; (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact, necessary in order to make the statements made in light of circumstances under which they made, not misleading; (c) to engage in any act practice or
course of business which operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
3. Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1981); see TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1976). The Texas two year statute of limitations for actions based on fraud applies to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1976). See
White v. Bond, 362 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tex. 1962).
4. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1981); see also 1963
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, § 12, at 478.
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Statute applies to 10b-5 actions when Texas is the forum state and when
the cause of action accrued prior to 1977.1
Federal courts have long recognized an implied civil action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for damages resulting
from violation of Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5,' despite
evidence of congressional intent to the contrary.7 The implication of civil
remedies under rule 10b-5 required federal courts to fashion substantive
and procedural rules that were not provided for by Congress.8 One of the
first issues to arise in private 10b-5 actions was the selection of an appropriate limitations period. e Although the question arises under federal law,
federal courts have adopted limitation periods from the law of the forum
state in deference to a long standing judicial reluctance to create statutes
of limitations as a matter of federal common law.1 e This policy has been

5. Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1981).
6. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (private remedies necessary
to effectuate purpose of 1934 Act); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 1953)
(federal courts may fashion remedy when federally created right invaded); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (first case to imply civil action
under rule lOb-5).
7. The legislative history of section 10(b) is silent as to private enforcement. Cf. S. Rep.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934). The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), however, has been forcefully argued as
evidence Congress did not intend for section 10(b) to create private rights. See Ruder, Civil
Liability Under Rule 1ob-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent? 57 NW.L.J. 627, 633

(1963).
8. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.2,
at 461 (1970). The law of rule 10b-5 has in large part been judicially created. Id. § 2.3.
Unlike the express liability provision throughout the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 10(b) does not provide a statute of limitations. Compare
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) (section 10(b) contains no limitations period) with id. § 77m (1977)
(all actions authorized under 1933 Act must be brought within one year after discovery of
violation and never more than three years) and id. § 78i(e) (within one year after discover or
three years after violation for market manipulation) and id. § 79p(b) (two years for short
swing profits) and id. § 79r(c) (misleading statements: within one year of discovery and
within three years of violation) and id. § 78cc(b) (recission within one year of discovery and
three years of violation) (1977).
9. See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1953) (Washington limitations
period applied by stipulation); Fischman v. Ratheon Mfg. Co., 188 F:2d 783, 787 (2d Cir.
1951) (decided question de novo).
10. See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 613-20 (1895); McCluny v. Silliman, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 276-78 (1830). Campbell construed the Rules of Decision Act to require application of state law in actions to enforce federally created rights. See Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U.S. 610, 614 (1895); Rules of Decisions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). The Rules of
Decisions Act, however, only applies to diversity claims. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 66 (1938). Thus, the practice of applying state law to federal causes of action is
done so as a matter of judicial discretion rather than constitutional mandate. See, e.g.,
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966) (state limitation period adopted as
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consistently followed; however, the selection of alternative states of limitations within a given forum state has been far from uniform."
Federal courts have followed two similar, yet distinguishable, lines of
analysis in selecting limitation periods from among various state fraud
provisions.'1 Following the United States Supreme Court decision in
UA W v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,1s many courts couched the problem in
terms of selecting a limitations period from the forum state "which best
effectuates the federal policy at issue."' 4 Repeated application of this test,
led some courts to conclude the broad remedial policies behind rule 10b-5
would be "best effectuated" by adopting limitation periods from state actions resembling rule 10b-5.15 Thus, a number of courts began to elaboa matter of policy in federal action to enforce collective bargaining contract); McNeal v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 891 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979) (state limitations statute adopted as a matter of federal common law); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961) (creating statute of limitation is "not the kind of
thing judges do"). See generally Hill, State ProceduralLaw in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. Rav. 66, 79-80 (1955).
11. Compare White v. Sanders, 650 F.2d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 1981)
(limitations statute in
Alabama Securities Act applied to 10b-5 action) and Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d
641, 644 (9th Cir. 1980) (state limitations period for breach of trust applied to 10b-5 action)
with McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 894 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Georgia statute of limitations for general fraud applied).
1-2. Compare Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967) (the correct statute is
one which "best effectuates" the federal policy behind rule 10b-5) with Berry Petroleum Co.
v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1975) (should apply limitations period for cause
of action most similar to 10b-5 and which best effectuates rule's purpose).
13. 386 U.S. 696 (1966). In Hoosier, the Court looked to state law for a statute of limitations in an action under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
185 (1977). See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 386 U.S. 696, 701 (1966). The Court characterized the action as one for breach of contract and applied an Indiana statute of limitations for actions on written contracts. See id. at 701.
14. See, e.g., Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir.
1975) (limitations period in Illinois securities act best effectuates federal policy behind rule
10b-5); Douglass v. Glen E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1971) (in selecting
state limitation statute issue is one of how to best effectuate federal objectives underlying
rule 10b-5); Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997, 999 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (should select
limitation statute consistent with structure and purpose of federal action). The purpose of
the 1934 Act is to remove impediments from national markets and ensure maintenance of
fair and honest transactions. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b
(1977).
15. See, e.g., Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1000 (5th Cir.
1974) (limitations statute in Florida Securities Act best effectuates federal policy because of
similarity to rule 10b-5); Parrent v. Midwestern Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir.
1972) (statute which most resembles 10b-5 best effectuates its purpose); Vanderboom v.
Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir. 1970) (to select state statute which best effectuates
federal policy should ask which statute resembles rule 10b-5). But cf. Nickels v. Koehler
Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1976) (broad remedial purposes of federal
securities act "best served by longer, not shorter statutes of limitations"); Newman v. Prior,
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rate on the test by making an independent inquiry of the extent to which
the state cause of action "substantively resembles" the federal cause of
action under rule 10b-5.1' Regardless of the test used, courts have invariably adopted either the forum state's limitation statute for fraud 7 or a
statute of limitations provided in the state's securities act."8
Under the "substantive resemblance" test, the choice depends on two
variables: the substantive elements of a cause of action under the forum
state's laws on securities fraud, and the particular circuit's requirements
for a Rule 10b-5 cause of action." Most circuit courts agree on the elements of a cause of action under rule 10b-5. The plaintiff must prove he
purchased or sold a security" in reliance 2' on a material misrepresenta-

518 F.2d 97, 100 n.4 (4th Cir. 1975) (limitations period not longer than those provided in
other provisions of 1934 Act).
16. See Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1976) (limitation period chosen on basis of state law's resemblance to 10b-5 and purpose of federal
law); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1975) (courts should
apply limitations period for state action most similar to federal action and which best effectuates rule's purpose). See generally Jacobs, Affirmative Defenses to Securities Exchange
Act Rule 10b-5, 61 CORNELL L.J. 857, 864-67 (1976). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has apparently abandoned the "effectuation of federal' policy criteria," framing the
issue exclusively in terms of which state provision "bears the closest substantive resemblance" to rule 10b-5. See McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888,
891 (5th Cir. 1979).
17. See, e.g., McNeal-v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 894 (5th
Cir. 1979) (Georgia statute of limitations for general fraud adopted); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d
1351, 1355 (10th Cir. 1974) (Utah statute of limitations for general fraud adopted); Vanderboom V. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir. 1970) (Arkansas statute of limitations for
fraud adopted).
18. See, e.g., White v. Sanders, 650 F.2d 627, 633 (5th Cir. 1981) (limitations statute. in
Alabama securities act applied); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287,
1294 (7th Cir. 1975).(statute of limitations in Illinois Blue Sky Act applied); Hudak v. Economic Research Analyists, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1000 (5th Cir. 1974) (limitation period in Flqrida securities act applied).
19. See, e.g., In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 392 F. Supp. 672,675-78 (S.D. Iowa
1975) (state law used to determine parameters of state cause of action and federal law for
10b-5); Klapmeiser v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212, 1215-16 (D. Minn.
1973) (using state law to determine elements of state cause of action and federal law for
lOb-5); Gilbert v. Meyer, 362 F. Supp. 168, 172-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (federal law determines
parameters of 10b-5). See Jacobs, Affirmative Defenses To Securities Exchange Act Rule
10b-5, 61 CORNELL L.J. 857, 866 (1976); SCHULMAN, Statutes of Limitations in lOb-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 635, 640 (1967).
20. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (private
action under 10b-5 confined to actual purchasers or sellers); Marbury Management, Inc. v.
Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1980) (retention of stock in reliance on misrepresentation
not actionable because no purchase or sale transpired); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,
193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952) ("in connection with" language in § 10(b) limits right of
action to purchasers or sellers); see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §
78(j) (1976).
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tion or omission, 2 and that the misrepresentation or omission was made
with scienter.2 ' The circuits conflict, however, over the degree of culpability required to establish scienter"4 and the extent to which the plaintiff
must prove he relied on the misrepresentation.ss
Two state remedies are available for securities fraud in Texas: section
27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code26 and section 33 of the
Texas Securities Act.2 7 Section 27.01 essentially represents a codification

of common law fraud as applied to real estate and stock transactions."

21. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 547 (5th Cir. 1981)
(district court erred in not submitting reliance and causation issue to jury); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 718 (2d Cir. 1980) (must establish/ misrepresented fact
proximately caused loss); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir.
1974) (transaction causation shown when plaintiff demonstrates reliance on misrepresentation), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). The element of reliance includes inducement and
loss causation. Rule lOb-5 requires proof of both. See 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE
10b-5, § 64.01(a), at 3-221 (Supp. 1980) (reliance includes transaction causation and loss
causation).
22. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (material facts are those which reasonable investor might have considered important in making
investment decision); accord Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir.
1974); Shapiro v. -Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir.
1974).
23. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. -Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198-202 (1976) (civil action
under lOb-5 requires proof of mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 545 (5th Cir. 1981) (10b-5 action
does not lie for simple or inexcusable negligence); Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo Sec.
Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979) (must show reckless or intentional conduct), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
24. Compare Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978) (recklessness may suffice as scienter for purposes of the antifraud provisions) with Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 545 (5th Cir. 1981) (to service as scienter reckless conduct requires "extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care . . . so obvious that
the actor must have been aware of it"). See generally Bolger, Recklessness and Rule lOb-5
Scienter Standard After Hochfelder, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 817, 819-22 (1980).
25. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). In
Ute the Supreme Court held that in certain non-disclosure cases, plaintiff does not have to
prove reliance in order to recover under 10b-5. Id. at 154. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Ute merely creates a presumption of reliance in non-disclosure cases.
See Simon .v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir.
1973); see also Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1981) (due
diligence required as a separate element in 10b-5 cases, apart from questions of materiality
and reliance).
26. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968).
27. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
28. See Huff, Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 27.01: An Alternative To
Federal Securities Fraud Remedies, 33 Sw. L.J. 703, 708-11 (1979). In Texas, the elements
of actionable common law fraud consists of a "false material representation; the speaker
made it knowing it to be false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and
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Accordingly, the two year limitations period for general fraud applies to
the statute. 29 A cause of action under 27.01 exists when (1) a false representation of a past or existing material fact is made for the purpose of
inducing a person to enter into a contract, and relied on by that person in
entering into that contract 0 or (2) when a person makes a false promise

to do an act with the intention of not fulfilling it, and the promise is
made for the purpose of inducing a person to enter into a contract and
relied on by that person in entering into that contract. 3' Section 27.01 can

be distinguished from common law fraud in two respects. First, the plaintiff is not required by the terms of the statute to prove the misrepresenta-

tion was made with intent to deceive if the misrepresentation concerns
the existence or nonexistence of a material fact. 8 Second, the defrauded
party is authorized to recover benefit of the bargain damages rather than
the common law out of pocket measure of recovery.88 Section 33 of the
pre-1977 Texas Securities Act, on the other hand, only provided civil
remedies in favor of purchasers of securities for material misrepresentations made in connection with a sale. 4 Although the act did not require

the element of reliance, the buyer carried the burden of proving he did
not know of the untruth or omission. 8 Unlike section 27.01, purchasers

as a positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by
the party; that the party acted in reliance upon it; that he thereby suffered injury." Stone v.
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977); see Custom Leasing, Inc. v.
Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. 1974); United States Steel Corp. v.
Fryer, 493 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tex. 1973).
29. See White v. Bond, 362 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tex. 1962); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5526 (Vernon 1968). The two year statute of limitations in article 5526 applies to actions
brought under section 27.01. White v. Bond, 362 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tex. 1962); see TEx. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968).
30. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(1) (Vernon 1968).
31. Id. § 27.01(a)(2).
32. Compare id. § 27.01(a)(1) (actionable fraud consists of false representation of past
or existing material fact made for purpose of inducing contract) with Stone v. Lawyers Title
Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977) (common law fraud requires proof that speaker
knew statement was false or that he made it recklessly without knowledge of it's truth) and
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(2) (Vernon 1968) (if misrepresentation concerns
promise to do act it must be alleged and proved that it Was made with intent of not fulfilling
it). The omission of scienter in the context of misrepresentations of'fact is significant of
legislative intent. See Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers,32 TExAs L. Rav. 1, 13
n.37 (1953).
33. Compare TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(b) (Vernon 1968) (person defrauded
may recover difference between value as represented and actual value) with George v. Hessee, 100 Tex. 44, 46-48, 93 S.W. 107, 108 (1906) (only out of pocket damages recoverable for
common law fraud).
34. See Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, § 12, at 478. Section 33 was substantially amended in
1977. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
35. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp.
1982). Under the old act,
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did not have to show scienter in order to recover under the pre-1977
Texas Securities Act.86 Violations of section 33 were, and still are, subject
to a three year statute of limitations."7
M the United States Court
In Wood v. Combustion Engineering,"
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined these two fraud provisions in determining the timeliness of a 10b-5 action brought in Texas.' Applying the
"substantive resemblance" test, the court concluded section 27.01 more
closely approximated rule 10b-5 and, therefore, adopted its two year statute of limitations.' 0 The court found section 33 inconsistent with rule
10b-5 on several grounds. First, the court noted section 33 does not predicate liability on a finding of scienter, thus allowing a considerably broader
cause of action than that available under rule 10b-5 and section 27.01."1
Moreover, section 33, at the time suit was filed, only applied to sales or
offers of sale; whereas, purchasers and sellers may sue under rule 10b-5
and section 27.01. 4 2 The court further distinguished section 33 by noting

the purchaser carried the additional burden of proving he could not have known of the
untruth or omission in the exercise of reasonable care. See 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, §
12, at 478. The 1977 amendments to section 33 relieved the plaintiff of this burden. See
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982); Bromberg, Civil Liabilities Under Texas Securities Act § 33 (1977) And Related Claims, 32 Sw. L.J. 867, 874
(1978).
36. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The most significant change in the new act is that defendant sellers and buyers are given an affirmative
defense to liability if they can prove they did not know of the untruth or omission and could
not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Compare 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch.
170, § 170, at 478 with Tzx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(B) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
37. See TEx. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(H) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The amended
version of section 33 carries the same 3 year limitations period as the pre-1977 Act. See 1963
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, § 12, at 478. Both versions permit the period to be shortened
through recision offers. See generally Bromberg, Civil Liabilities Under Texas Securities
Act § 33 (1977) And Related Claims, 33 Sw. L.J. 867, 949 (1978).
38. 643 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).
39. See id. at 342. Since the claim in Wood arose prior to 1977, the court only considered the state law in effect at that time. Therefore, the court limited its discussion to the
pre-1977 Act. See id. at 342 n.6; 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, § 12, at 478.
40. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 1981). The court
limited its review to comparing substantive elements of state and federal law rejecting any
independent considerations. Id. at 344 n..
41. See id. at 346. The court relied on Susanoil v. Continental Oil Co., 519 S.W.2d 230,
234 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ rerd n.r.e.), in concluding section 27.01 required proof of scienter to establish actionable fraud. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc.,
643 F.2d 339, 345 n.18 (5th Cir. 1981).
42. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 1981). Compare
1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, § 12, at 478 (only purchasers can sue) with Blue Chip Stamps
v. Mannor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 721, 722-23 (1975) (purchaser or sellers may sue Under rule
10b-5) and TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(c) (Vernon 1976) (may bring action against
any person who makes or benefits from false representation).
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the act requires a tender of the security as a condition for bringing suit.
Finally, the court observed section 33 omitted any reference to reliance,
while section 27.01 expressly requires proof of reliance and rule lOb-5 has
been held to require reliance when material facts have been misrepresented."" The court reserved the question of whether the new Texas Securities Act would require a contrary result in 10b-5 actions arising after
1977.6

In light of the 1977 amendments to the Texas Securities Act,"6 it is

doubtful that Wood will carry any precedental value in 10b-5 actions accruing after 1977.47 Under the amended act, section 33 has been expanded
to provide civil remedies for defrauded sellers, bringing the scope of persons liable in line with -federal 10b-5 purchase and sale rules.' 8 The
amended act also provides a due diligence defense which allows a defendant to escape liability by proving he did not know of the untruth or
omission and could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence.'9 Although a due diligence defense does not equate scienter in the
common law meaning,50 the new provision arguably brings the defendant's standard of culpability closer to federal notions of scienter as construed in 10b-5 actions."' For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently intimated that scienter may be
inferred under certain circumstances when statements are made with a

43. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1981). Neither
section 27.01 or rule 10b-5 requires a tender of the security as a prerequisite for recovery.
See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
44. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1981).
45. See id. at 345 n.12.
46. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
47. Compare Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981)
(applicable statute of limitation is period which applies to state action bearing the closest
substantive resemblance to rule 10b-5) with 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, § 12, at 478 (only
purchasers can sue, defendants absolutely liable for misstatements or omissions) and TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (purchasers and sellers liable for
misstatements or omissions, defendant's given due diligence defense).
48. Compare Blue Chip Stamp v. Mannor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (buyers
and sellers may sue under rule 10b-5) with TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(B), comment (Vernon Supp. 1982) (seller and buyers may bring suit).
49. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
51. See L. PRossEaR, LAW OF TORTS 700 (4th ed. 1971). Scienter means an intent to
deceive, to mislead or to convey a false impression. See id. at 700.
51. Compare Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-204 (1976) (action under
10b-5 requires proof of mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud)
with TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) & (B) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (person not
liable if he proves he did not know of the untruth or omission and in exercise of reasonable
care could not have known of the untruth or omission) and 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, §
12, at 478 (sellers absolutely liable for misrepresentation or omission).
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reckless disregard for truth or falsity.s Thus, a 10b-5 plaintiff need not
always prove the actor knew his statement was false. 5 ' Although drafted
as an affirmative defense, the due diligence standard under the amended
version of section 33, at minimum, creates an issue as to the defendant's
state of mind.5 '
Moreover, a closer examination of section 27.01 reveals the court in
Wood made a questionable assumption regarding the element of scienter
under the statute.5 ' Although section 27.01 requires that the misrepresentation be made for the purpose of inducing a person to enter into a contract, the statute does not speak to the issue of whether the speaker's
misstatement must have been made with the intent to deceive." Several
Texas courts have held that scienter is not required under 27.01 when the
misrepresentation concerns the existence or non-existence of a material
fact.5 7 Since the decision in Wood emphasized the element of scienter in
comparing the two statutes, a contrary result could obtain under the

52. See Huddleston v. Herman & Mclean, 640 F.2d 534, 545 (5th Cir. 1981). In order
for reckless conduct to suffice as scienter "there must be an exteme departure from standards of ordinary care ... so obvious the actor knew or must have been aware." Id. at 545.
53. Cf. id. at 545 (circumstantial evidence sufficient for jury to infer requisite scienter
even though no direct testimony defendants acted knowingly).
54. See Tax. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 581--33(A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
55. Compare Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 n.18 (5th Cir. 1981) (§
27.01 does not require scienter) with White v. Bond, 355 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo) (unqualified statement of fact actionable regardless of scienter), rev'd on
other grounds, 362 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1962). The court in Wood relied on Susanoil Inc. v.
Continental Oil Co., 579 S.W.2d 230, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1975, writ rerd
n.r.e.) in concluding scienter was a necessary element of a cause of action under 27.01. See
Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 n.18 (5th Cir. 1981); Susanoil Inc. v.
Continental Oil Co., 579 S.W.2d 230, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ rerd
n.r.e.). In Susanoil the issue before the was whether summary judgment proof was sufficient
to raise a disputed issue of fact in a suit under the statutory predecessor to section 27.01.
See Susanoil Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 579 S.W.2d 230-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975, writ refd n.r.e.). The court held that a cause of action alledging false promises to
perform an act requires proof that the promise was made with the intent not to perform. Id.
at 236. Section 27.01 on the other hand, omits any requirement of scienter for misrepresentations of a fact as opposed to a promise. See Tax. Bus. & CoM. Cons ANN. § 27.01(a)(1)
(Vernon 1976).
56. See Tix. Bus. & COM. Cons ANN. § 27.01(a)(1)(A) (Vernon 1968). Since the statute
under section 27.01(c) provides exemplary damages for willful misrepresentations, it would
appear an innocent misrepresentation would suffice for general liability. See Keeton, Rights
of DisappointedPurchasers,32 TExAs L. Rav. 1, 12 n.37 (1953).
57. See, e.g., White v. Bond, 355 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962)
(false statement of fact made with intent to induce action implies fraudulent purpose), rev'd
on other grounds, 362 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1962); Passero v. Loew, 259 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1953, writ refd n.r.e.) (knowledge of falsity not required); Roark v. Prideaux, 284 S.W. 624, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1926) (good faith no excuse), a/f'd,
291 S.W. 868, 870 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judm't adopted).
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amended act. 8s
The decision in Wood demonstrates the inconvenience of comparing
state and federal law in order to determine the timeliness of a federal
action.59 The practice promotes non-conformity and uncertainty on an issue of vital importance to a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation."
Further complications arise when a state amends or enacts a new statutory action requiring federal courts to re-examine the issue under the applicable test.6 1 Moreover, federal law on rule 10b-5 has not remained
static. s Under a "substantive resemblance" analysis, decisions altering
the substantive elements of the rule may also require reassessment of the
applicable statute of limitations."
58. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 n.19, 346 n.20 (5th Cir.
1981). The court in Wood noted the absence of due diligence under the old act; however, the
court indicated that that factor alone did not bear as much weight as the scienter and reliance distinctions. Id. at 346.
59. See McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 892 (5th Cir.
1979) (Ainsworth, J.) (characterized substantive resemblance test as a "difficult and essentially esoteric exercise"). See generally Bateman, Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5: Complexity in Need of Reform, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 165,
181 (1975); Schulman, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Complication Added to
Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. Rav. 365, 366-67 (1967).
60. Compare Wood v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 1981) (two
years in Texas) with I.D.S. Progressive Fund Inc. v. First of Michigan Corp., 533 F.2d 340,
344 (6th Cir. 1976) (six years in Michigan) and Weiser v. Schwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 391
(E.D. Pa. 1968) (one year in Louisiana). When a case is transferred to another state, the
transferee court applies the statute of limitations from the original forum state. See Berry
Petroleum v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1975). In Berry, a 10b-5 action
originally brought in Texas was consolidated and transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to New York. Id. at 406. The second circuit applied the three year statute of limitations in the Texas Securities Act. Id. at 409; see also Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54(1972) (in non disclosure cases positive proof of
reliance not required).
61. See Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915, 917-18 (4th Cir. 1976) (amendments to
Maryland securities act made statute more analagous to 10b-5, thus rendering prior precedent inapplicable). But see I.D.S. Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First Nat'l of Michigan, 533 F.2d
340, 355 (6th Cir. 1976) (limitations period applicable to actions should not be changed
without good cause); Nichols v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir.
1975) (federal policy best effectuated by continued application of four year statute of
limitations).
62. See 1 A.

BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD

§

2.2, at 463 (1970.
63. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'r Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 1981). The court in
Wood declined to follow any decisions prior to Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), which held that scienter is a necessary element of an action brought under 10b-5.
Compare Wood v. Combustion Eng'r Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 1981) (post
Hochfelder decision applying statute of limitations for general fraud to 10b-5 action) with
Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1975) (pre Hochfelder
decision holding section 33 more similar to 10b-5 actions).
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One can only speculate as to whether the 1977 amendments to section
33 will produce a new three year statute of limitations under "substantive
resemblance" analysis. The very fact that the question remains undecided
illustrates the inexpediency of looking to state law for a statute of limitations in 10b-5 actions. In the interest of uniformity and judicial economy,
Congress must enact a uniform statute of limitations for all 10b-5
claims. 6' In the meantime, courts could end the cumbersome process by
adopting a limitations period from one of the express liability provisions
in the 1934 Act.05
Richard M. Mosher

64. See MODEL FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1421 (Tent. Draft No.2, 1973) (proposes
uniform period of two years after discovery, but in no event more than four years after the
action accrues).
65. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1977). The 1934 Act
provides statutes of limitations for actions under sections 9(c) (three years), 16(b) (two
years), 18 (three years), 29(b) (three years). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(c), 79p(b), 78(c), 78cc(b)
(1977). In IDS Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Michigan Corp., 533 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir.
1976) the court considered but rejected a proposal to implement a uniform statute of limitations based upon the express limitations periods governing other sections of federal securities law.
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